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THE ADOPTION OF A CLASS ACTION RULE:

SOME ISSUES FOR MISSISSIPPI TO CONSIDER
Robert H. Klonoff*
The symposium organizers have asked me to prepare a brief paper
addressing the following question: Assuming Mississippi decides to adopt a
class action rule, what terms should that rule contain?
A definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of a short
article. A class action rule could take a wide variety of approaches. To
evaluate fully the pros and cons of each approach, the analysis would need
to address not only the federal approach, but also all of the variations
among the states, as well as numerous reform proposals that have been
suggested but not enacted. Instead of offering and defending a precise proposed rule, this article will simply highlight several issues that the drafters
should consider. It will not propose a "model" rule.
At the outset, I should note that I fully endorse Mississippi's adoption
of a class action rule. Mississippi is the only state in the country without a
class action procedure for any kind of lawsuit.' In many circumstances, a
class action is the only vehicle for aggrieved individuals to seek redress.2 In
the absence of a class action rule, Mississippi litigants have attempted to
squeeze mass actions into the state's joinder rules, particularly Mississippi
Rule of Civil Procedure 20. As Justice Graves has noted, "[flor too long
our Rule 20 has been stretched and pulled in various directions, and forced
to accomplish tasks it was never designed to do."3 Thus, as Justice Graves
* Douglas Stripp/Missouri Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of
Law. Professor Klonoff is co-author of the West Group casebook on class actions (published in 2000,
2d ed. forthcoming 2006) and author of the Thomson West nutshell on class actions (2d edition 2004).
He has personally handled numerous class action cases throughout the country, including several cases
discussed in this article, as well as mass joinder cases in Mississippi. He currently serves as an Associate
Reporter for the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. Professor
Klonoff thanks Gregory Castanias and Professors Edward Bilich, Mark Herrmann, Suzette Malveaux,
and Patrick Woolley for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. He also thanks his
research assistants - Zhaoying Du, Desarae Harrah, Kevin Tuttle, and Ruzhen Wei - for their able
assistance.
1. Like Mississippi, Virginia does not have a global class action rule. See King v. Virginia BirthRelated Neurological Injury Compensation Program, 22 Va. Cir. 156, 159 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1990) ("[T]here
is no provision in Virginia law which allows class actions."). Unlike Mississippi, however, Virginia permits class actions in certain defined circumstances. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-384 (allowing a class
action by an association of time-share owners); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-515(A) (allowing a class action by
members of a property owners' association).
2. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those who command
the status quo."); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21,
24 (1996) ("[T]he class action could be viewed as a device to fund the private attorney general and is
able to play that role because of the aggregation of the claims of a large number of persons who have
similar or identical claims, none of which - standing alone - would justify the suit.").
3. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092, 1103 (Miss. 2004) (Graves, J., specially concurring).
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correctly concluded, "[i]t is imperative that [Mississippi] modernize
[its]
4
rules of civil procedure by adopting a class action provision."
APPROACHES FOR MISSISSIPPI TO CONSIDER

This article addresses several issues in connection with the drafting of
a class action rule. First, it examines the two major structural approaches
for a rule: (1) a unitary rule, in which all class actions would be determined
under a single standard, and (2) a rule divided into various types of class
actions, along the lines of the approach used in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Second, the article addresses a variety of issues that commonly
arise in connection with the class certification decision: whether merits issues may be considered; whether the burden of proof should be on plaintiff
or on defendant; and whether a court may certify a class conditionally even
when doubts exist about the appropriateness of certification. Third, the
article addresses issues involving appointing class counsel and awarding attorneys' fees. Fourth, the article addresses two settlement-related issues:
the certification standards applicable at the settlement stage; and whether a
court should allow a second opt-out right when a settlement is announced.
Finally, the article discusses issues relating to the review and binding effect
of class certification rulings, i.e., whether to permit interlocutory review of
class certification rulings; and whether a previous ruling on class certification should preclude the filing of a new, substantially similar class.
I.

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE RULE: MULTIPLE CATEGORIES OR A
UNITARY STANDARD?

A.

Structure of the Current Federal Rule 23

The current federal class action rule dates back to 1966. It is the
model for state class action rules in roughly two-thirds of the states.5
Federal Rule 23 provides for four kinds of classes: those under Rule
23(b)(1)(A), Rule 23(b)(1)(B), Rule 23(b)(2), and Rule 23(b)(3). Each of
these four classes must satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, 6 commonality,7 typicality, 8 and adequacy of representation.9 Moreover, each of the four Rule 23(b) subcategories has its own additional
requirements.
4. Id.
5. See

ROBERT

H.

KLONOFF

&

EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-

PARTY LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

439 (West Group 2000) (discussing state breakdown). See

generally Linda S. Mullenix, State Class Actions: Practice and Procedure (CCH 2000) (state-by-state
review of class action rules).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) ("the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable").
7. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(a)(2) ("there are questions of law or fact common to the class").
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) ("the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class").
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) ("the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class").
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In particular, a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class is appropriate when the prosecution of separate, individual lawsuits would create a risk of "inconsistent
or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class ... ."' The purpose of this provision is to protect the party
opposing the class from being subject to conflicting court orders."1 One
example cited in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 rule is litigation of "landowners' rights and duties respecting a claimed nuisance," 12a
situation that "could create a possibility of incompatible adjudications.'
A Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class is appropriate when the prosecution of separate, individual lawsuits would create a risk of "adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests[.]"' 3 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is designed to protect the members of the class.
As the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 version of Rule 23 indicate,
an example of a (b)(1)(B) class is a limited fund, i.e., "when claims are
made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all
claims."' 4
A Rule 23(b)(2) class is appropriate when "the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole[.]" 15 Rule 23(b)(2) is
common in civil rights cases and other suits seeking primarily structural
relief.
A Rule 23(b)(3) class is appropriate if (1) "the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members," and (2) "a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy., 16 Rule 23(b)(3) is commonly used for claims
seeking primarily monetary relief.
A critical distinction between a (b)(3) class on the one hand, and classes under (b)(1) and (b)(2) on the other, is that the former requires notice
and opt-out rights (the right to exclude oneself from the class) while the
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
11. Normally, the party opposing the class is the defendant, but in a suit brought against a class
of defendants, the party on the opposite side of the class would be the plaintiff. See Robert H. Klonoff,
Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell 289-98 (Thomson West 2004) (discussing
defendant class actions).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee notes (1966).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee notes (1966).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) sets forth several criteria relevant to superiority,
including manageability, i.e., "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
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latter do not. 7 Put another way, unlike classes under Rule 23(b)(3), classes under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) are mandatory; a class member has no

choice whether to participate.
B.

Criticisms of the Current Federal Approach

The current federal class action rule has remained largely intact for
almost forty years. 8 This longevity, however, does not mean that the federal approach is flawless. To the contrary, several criticisms can be

mounted.
For instance, why are "superiority" and "predominance" required only
for (b)(3) classes? Shouldn't courts consider superiority in all class actions,

regardless of which subdivision of Rule 23(b) is at issue? And shouldn't
predominance be considered in most class actions? 9 Indeed, with respect
to predominance, shouldn't some mandatory class actions require even
more cohesiveness than opt-out classes?20 Courts have struggled with

these issues. Some courts, for example, impose a "cohesiveness" requirement under Rule 23(b)(2) that is at least as stringent as (b)(3)'s "predomi-

nance" requirement. 2 '

Other courts, however, refuse to impose a

predominance-like requirement outside of Rule 23(b)(3). 2 z
Another criticism of Federal Rule 23 is that classes under (b)(1)(A),
(b)(1)(B), and (b)(2) do not provide for notice and an opportunity to opt
out, even when the action in question seeks significant monetary relief.
According to these critics, due process requires notice and opt-out rights

before monetary claims can be barred by res judicata2 3 Some courts have

17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring notice in a (b)(3) case including, inter alia, "that
the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded"); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) ("For any class certified under Rule
23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class") (emphasis added).
18. As discussed on p. 262, supra, Federal Rule 23 has been amended in several ways since 1966.
Those amendments, however, have not altered the basic structure of the rule.
19. Professor Erichson correctly notes that the predominance requirement should not apply to
limited fund class actions. See Howard M. Erichson, Comments on a Class Action Rule for Mississippi,
24 Miss. C. L. REV. 309, 316 (2005).
20. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 435 (2000) ("a more rigorous definition of
class cohesion should apply in the case of the mandatory class action where the class member is essentially being coerced into participation").
21. See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 142 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he cohesiveness requirement . . . extends beyond Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. Indeed, a (b)(2) class may require
more cohesiveness than a (b)(3) class."), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1114 (1999); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 F.R.D. 619, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (same). In Barnes, the court relied heavily on (b)(3) case law
in holding that a putative medical monitoring class action comprised of cigarette smokers raised "too
many individual issues to permit certification." 161 F.3d at 143.
22. See, e.g., Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Although common issues
must predominate for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), no such requirement exists under
23(b)(2).").
23. See, e.g, Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]ertain minimal procedural
safeguards, such as notice and the right to opt-out, must be provided to bind absent class members
when substantial monetary damages are involved.") (citing Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.3d 386,
392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 511 U.S. 117 (1994)); Jefferson v. Ingersoll
Intl., Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999) ("in actions for money damages class members [in (b)(2)
cases] are entitled to personal notice and an opportunity to opt out").
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addressed this problem by requiring notice and opt-out rights in certain
class actions under (b)(1) or (b)(2), relying on Federal Rule 23(d), which
allows the court to enter "appropriate" procedural orders.24 A recent
amendment to Federal Rule 23 (adopted in 2003) provides that "[f]or any
class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate
notice to the class."'2 5 This amendment makes clear that a court has discretion to require notice in a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class action. The amendment does not, however, address the issue of opt-outs in such classes.
Another possible criticism of the current rule is that the four categories, while purportedly separate, overlap considerably. 26 For instance, it is
arguably difficult to determine what purpose Rule 23(b)(1)(A) serves that
is not also served by Rule 23(b)(2).
In sum, the division of Federal Rule 23 into four separate kinds of
class actions has not been without problems or criticisms. These issues
have led some to believe that a unitary approach would be preferable.
C.

The Unitary Approach

States that have opted not to adopt the Federal Rule 23 model have
taken a variety of approaches. The alternative to Federal Rule 23 that
has attracted the most attention, however, is the so-called unitary approach. Under that approach, only one test would apply in certifying a
class, not the four alternative tests contained in Rule 23.
In 1995, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules considered converting Rule 23 into a unitary rule. Under that proposal, the four separate
categories of (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3) would be eliminated.
Instead, those four categories would simply be considered relevant factors
in deciding whether a class action is "superior to other available methods
for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."28
Specifically, under the proposed Rule 23(b), superiority would become
a fifth criterion under a new Rule 23(a)(5), supplementing numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy.2 9 The original (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B),
(b)(2), and (b)(3) criteria would become "matters pertinent in deciding
under (a)(5) whether a class action is superior to other available methods
24. See, e.g, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) (allowing "appropriate orders" requiring "notice be given in
such manner as the court may direct"); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(5) (allowing orders "dealing with similar
procedural matters"). Courts using 23(d) to require notice and opt-out rights in classes under (b)(1)
and (b)(2) include County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1304 (2d Cir. 1990);
and Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
26. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millennium
and the Blurring of CategoricalImperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 216 (2003).

27. See KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note 5,at 439.
28. See Feb. 1995 Proposed Rule 23(a)(5), reprinted in Edward H. Cooper, Symposium: The
Institute of Judicial Administration Research Conference on Class Actions: Class Actions and the
Rulemaking Process: Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L.REv. 13, 64 (1996).
29. Id., Feb. 1995 Proposed Rule 23(a)(5).
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.... "30 Thus, instead of being categories for four separate types of class
actions (as under the current federal rule), those criteria would merely be
factors in deciding whether the proposed class is superior to other devices
for resolving the case. Because these factors serve only as guidance, the

proposal would give trial judges considerable discretion in ruling on
certification.
Under this proposed unitary approach, notice would be required for
all classes certified.3 1 Moreover, with respect to any class certified, the
court would have the option to make the class a mandatory class, an optout class, or an opt-in class.3 2 The proposed rule then lists matters relevant
to whether to structure the class as mandatory, opt-out, or opt-in.3 3
Even prior to 1995, respected authorities had urged wide adoption of a
unitary approach to class actions. Most importantly, in 1976, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws published the "Uniform Class Actions Act."3 4 In many ways, the Uniform Act was the model
for the federal proposal urged almost twenty years later. Section two of the
Uniform Act provides that a class action may be certified if the requirements of numerosity, commonality, and adequacy are satisfied, and in addition, a class action will promote "the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." Section three, in turn, provides a non-exclusive list of thirteen criteria for the court to "consider" and "give appropriate weight to,"
in determining whether a class action would promote fairness and efficiency.35 These criteria include the (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3)
criteria.3 6 Most classes would be opt-out classes, but the Uniform Act proposal permits mandatory
classes "in actions comparable to those under
37
Federal Rule 23(b)(1).Ultimately, neither the federal proposal nor the Uniform Act gained
stature as a major alternative to the Federal Rule 23 model. By 1996, the
30. Id., Feb. 1995 Proposed Rule 23(b). The proposed rule lists several other matters that a court
should consider in evaluating superiority, including several criteria found in the existing Federal Rule
23(b)(3) - e.g., predominance, interest of class members in individually controlling the litigation, and
the extent of related litigation by or against members of the class. See id. at 64-65, Feb. 1995 Proposed
Rule 23(b)(1)-(7).
31. Id. at 65-66, Feb. 1995 Proposed Rule 23(c)(2).
32. See id. at 65, Feb. 1995 Proposed Rule 23(c)(1)(A) (court must "determine whether, when,
how, and under what conditions putative members may elect to be excluded from, or included in, the
class").
33. Id. at 65, Feb. 1995 Proposed Rule 23(c)(1)(A)(i)-(v). Courts have held under existing Rule
23 that opt-in classes are forbidden. See Kern v. Siemens Corp., et al., 393 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2004)
(noting "substantial legal authority" for the view that an opt-in procedure - whereby a person does not
become a class member unless he or she affirmatively opts in - is "prohibited" by Rule 23).
34. Uniform Law Commissioner's Model Class Actions Act (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, final draft adopted Aug. 5, 1976), (hereafter the "Uniform Act").
35. Id. at § 3 (noting that court should consider the 13 criteria as well as "other relevant
factors").
36. Id. Other criteria include, among others, whether "a joint or common interest exists,"
whether "the class action involves a claim that is or has been the subject of a class action, a government
action, or other proceeding," and "whether any conflict of laws issues involved pose unusual difficulties[.]" Id.
37. Id. at § 8 Comment.
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federal approach had essentially disappeared as a serious option. And in
almost thirty years since the Uniform Act first appeared, only two states,
Iowa and North Dakota, have adopted it. 38
D. Analysis
Although few jurisdictions have actually adopted a uniform approach,
it is nonetheless an option for Mississippi to consider. Given the various
criticisms of the existing Federal Rule 23, Mississippi might view a unitary
approach as an attractive alternative. Its chief advantage is that it gives
trial courts flexibility to certify a class action if the efficiencies of such a
device would be achieved. In addition, it gives courts flexibility to decide
whether, based on the particular action, class members should be given the
right to opt out. The unitary approach embraces the view that the dividing
lines between classes under (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3) are artificial and unnecessarily rigid. It also recognizes that the question whether
to permit opt-outs should not depend solely on whether the court chooses
to certify the case under (b)(3), as opposed to (b)(1) or (b)(2).
The existing federal rule, by contrast, focuses solely on whether the
requirements of four specific categories are met. Only Federal Rule
23(b)(3) specifically asks whether common issues predominate and
whether a class action is the superior mechanism for resolving the dispute,
even though these issues would seem central to the vast majority of class
actions. Moreover, under Federal Rule 23, whether notice and opt-out
rights are required depends solely on whether the class is certified as a
mandatory (b)(1) or (b)(2) class or an opt-out (b)(3) class. In short, a unitary approach would give Mississippi courts greater flexibility than exists
under a strict application of Federal Rule 23. Nonetheless, despite the
problems with the current Federal Rule 23, Mississippi might be justifiably
concerned about undertaking a new, largely untested approach.
First, despite criticisms by some courts and commentators, Federal
Rule 23 has worked reasonably well and with a fair degree of flexibility
since its adoption almost forty years ago. For instance, as noted above, 39 a
number of courts have dealt with problems of opt-out versus mandatory
classes by holding that, under the existing rule, courts have discretion pursuant to Rule 23(d) to require notice and opt-out rights under (b)(1) and
(b)(2). 40 And some courts, recognizing that class actions do not generally
serve their purpose if individual issues predominate, have required cohesiveness even outside of Rule 23(b)(3). 4 1 Although the existing Federal
Rule 23, unlike the 1995 proposal, does not allow for opt-in classes,42 this
38.
Inc., 583
Uniform
39.
40.
41.
42.

See IOWA CODE ANN. Rule 1.261-1.280; N.D. R. Civ. P. 23; Peterson v. Dougherty Dawkins,
N.W. 2d 626, 628 n.3 (N.D. 1998) (noting that only North Dakota and Iowa have adopted the
Act approach).
See pp. 262-64, supra.
See supra, note 24 and accompanying text.
See p. 262, supra.
See supra, note 32 and accompanying text.
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may not be a critical omission. As one recent decision explains, opt-in clas-

ses are generally unsound as a policy matter because most people will not

take the necessary steps to affirmatively opt-in.4 3 Indeed, no federal court
has ever certified an opt-in class under Rule 23.
Second, by adopting the federal model, as most states have done, Mississippi would secure the advantage of a wide body of precedent. Even
though some of this precedent conflicts from one jurisdiction to another,
this vast body of case law would be nonetheless a huge advantage for Mississippi. The Mississippi courts would have the benefit of almost four decades of federal jurisprudence under the current version of Federal Rule
23. 4 1 Moreover, with the opportunity for interlocutory review under Federal Rule 23(f), adopted in 1998,46 an ever increasing body of federal appellate court precedent is now available. And because the vast majority of
states have adopted the 1966 version of the federal rule, Mississippi would
also have the benefit of case law in all of those states.47
Third, in contrast to the vast body of case law under Federal Rule 23,
Mississippi would have little guidance in construing a unitary rule. As
noted,4 8 only Iowa and North Dakota have adopted the Uniform Act approach. Neither state has much pertinent case law. 49 Absent substantial
guidance from other states, decisional conflicts would inevitably develop as

Mississippi judges applied the new unitary rule, thus requiring frequent review by the Mississippi Supreme Court to resolve such conflicts.
In sum, although a unitary approach has attractive features, Missis-

sippi may wish to opt for the more cautious approach of adhering to the
basic structure of the current Federal Rule 23, even with all of the criti-

cisms of that rule.
43. Kern, 393 F.3d 120, 124 ("'Requiring the individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in the
lawsuit would result in freezing out the claims of people - especially small claims held by small people who for one reason or another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or legal matters, will
simply not take the affirmative step."') (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397
(1967)).
44. Kern, 395 F.3d. at 125 (noting absence of opt-in classes under Federal Rule 23). Cf. id. at 128
(noting that cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), are opt-in classes).
45. See David W. Clark, Litigation in Mississippi Today: A Symposium: Life in Lawsuit Central:
An Overview of the Unique Aspects of Mississippi's Civil Justice System, 71 Miss. L.J. 359, 384-85 (2002)
("If Mississippi had a class action rule like the federal rule, judges could look to the vast number of
decisions made by the federal courts to assist them in determining if certification is proper.").
46. See p. 280-81, infra.
47. Numerous states that have adopted the language of Federal Rule 23 explicitly look for guidance to case law under Federal Rule 23. See, e.g., First Alabama Bank v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415 (Ala.
1982); Johnson v. Moore, 496 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1972).
48. See p. 266-67, supra.
49. If anything, the few published class certification decisions from those states only confirm the
wide discretion available to trial courts under the unitary approach. See, e.g., Luttenegger v. Conseco
Financial Servicing Corp., 671 N.W. 2d 425, 437 (Iowa 2003) (noting, with respect to the 13 factors, that
"[t]he district court need not assign weight to any of [those] factors" and "need not make written
findings as to each factor"); Bice v. Petro Hunt, 681 N.W. 2d 74, 79 (N.D. 2004) ("the trial court is not
required to specifically address each of the thirteen factors but must weigh the competing factors, none
of which is predominant").
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II.

THE CERTIFICATION DECISION

This section discusses a variety of important issues relevant to whether
a class should be certified. These issues do not depend on whether Mississippi adopts a unitary approach or instead adheres to the Federal Rule 23
model.
A.

Considering Merits Issues at the Class Certification Stage

The federal courts and many state courts are sharply divided over
whether a court may consider merits related issues in ruling on class certification. The source of the debate is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.5" There,
the Supreme Court held that a court may not make a preliminary evaluation of the merits of a case in deciding whether to shift the cost of notice to
the defendants. 1 Many courts have applied Eisen to hold that consideration of merits issues at the class certification stage is improper even if those
merits issues overlap with class certification issues.52 As one appellate
court stated in endorsing this position, "'a motion for class certification
is
53
case.'
the
of
merits
the
of
examination
for
occasion
an
not
In Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc.,4 the Seventh Circuit analyzed

this issue in detail and concluded that, in considering class certification, "a
judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under
Rule 23," including inquiries "relevant to both the merits and class certification. ' 55 According to the Szabo court, although Eisen prohibits a court
from saying "'I'm not going to certify a class unless I think that the plaintiffs will prevail[,]"' nothing in Rule 23 or Eisen "prevents the district court
from looking beneath the surface of a complaint to conduct the
inquiries
56
identified in [Rule 23] and exercise the discretion it confers.
In my view, the Seventh Circuit has the preferable approach. Without
the ability to consider issues that touch upon the merits, many facts critical
50. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
51. See id. at 177-78.
52. See, e.g., Daggett v. Blind Enterprises of Oregon, No. CV-95-421-ST, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22465, at *60 (D. Or. Apr. 18, 1996) (refusing to consider argument at class certification stage that the
representatives were subject to a collateral estoppel defense); Cook v. Rockwell Intl. Corp., 151 F.R.D.
378, 381 (D. Colo. 1993) ("'An inquiry into the merits of the claims of the representative or the class is
inappropriate when making the decision whether the action should be certified under Rule 23."')
(quoting 7A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1759 at 99 (1986). See also Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary'sFlawed Application of Rule 23's
"Adequacy of Representation" Requirement, 2004 MIcH. ST. L. REV. 671, 680-82 (2004) (discussing case
law in context of adequacy of representation).
53. In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 917 (2002) (quoting Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1107 (2000)).
54. 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
55. Id. at 676-77.
56. Id. at 677-78. Post Szabo, the courts remain divided with respect to the correctness of the
Seventh Circuit's approach. Compare, e.g., Unger v. Amedisys Inc., No. 03-30965, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2778, at*11-*12 (5th Cir. 2005) (endorsing Szabo approach); Gariety v. Thorton, 368 F.3d 356,
366 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) (same), with Shook v.
El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 2004) (adopting strict rule against considering merits
issues); In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., supra note 53, 280 F.3d at 135 (same).
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to class certification would be off limits to the court deciding certification.
For instance, if a class representative's claims were time barred, the representative would not be adequate or typical to represent a class of people
with timely claims. Yet, by refusing to consider "merits" issues, a court
would not address these serious adequacy and typicality concerns.
Mississippi should include language in its class action rule to make
clear that a court addressing class certification is free to make all necessary
factual and legal inquiries necessary to rule on certification, even if those
inquiries relate to the merits of the claims as well as to certification.
B.

Burden of Proof

In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,57 the United
States Supreme Court made clear that, in ruling on class certification under
Federal Rule 23, the court should certify a class only "after a rigorous analysis that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied."5 8 Many
courts hold, consistent with Falcon, that the burden is on the plaintiff to
satisfy each of the requirements for certifying a class under Federal Rule
23." A surprising number of courts, however, have shifted the burden on
class certification issues to the defendant.6 °
As Falcon recognizes, before a court invokes the machinery of a class
action, plaintiffs should bear the burden of demonstrating that all of the
prerequisites for certification have been satisfied. To make sure that Mississippi's trial courts take this approach, its class action rule should explicitly state that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish each of the
prerequisites for a class action.
C.

Elimination of ConditionalCertification

Prior to the 2003 amendments, Federal Rule 23 permitted "conditional" certification.6 1 This device permitted courts having doubts about
the propriety of a class action to certify a class with the possibility of decertifying it later if the prerequisites for certification were ultimately not established.6 2 Under conditional certification, many courts required all
57. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
58. Id. at 161. Accord, e.g., Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596 (7th
Cir. 1993); Valentino v. Howlett, 528 F.2d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 1976); Poindexter v. Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096,
1097 (4th Cir. 1972).
59. See, e.g., Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2001); In re
Ribozyme Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 572, 577 (D. Colo. 2001).
60. See, e.g., Lichoff v. CSX Transp., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 564, 575 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (requiring defendant to prove the inadequacy of representation); Abby v. City of Detroit, 218 F.R.D. 544, 548 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) (adequacy of representation presumed absent a contrary showing).
61. See Pre-2003 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1) (an order certifying a class "may be conditional").
62. See, e.g., Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 186, 188, 190 (4th Cir.
1993) (noting "[t]he tentative, limited nature of the conditional certification" and upholding certification despite the "daunting number of individual issues" and "concern about the manageability of [the]
litigation").
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doubts to be resolved in favor of certification.6 3 The 2003 amendments to
Federal Rule 23 eliminate the concept of conditional certification. As the
Advisory Committee Notes to those amendments point out, "[a] court that
is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met."6 4 As of yet, only one state
adopting the 1966 version of Federal Rule 23 has amended its rule to make
this change." Because the amendment to Federal Rule 23 took effect only
in December of 2003, it is not surprising that other states have not yet
adopted a corresponding amendment to their own class action rules. In
any event, Mississippi should follow the approach of the 2003 amendments
unless and until the
to make clear that a court should not certify a class
66
requirements for certification have been satisfied.
III.

APPOINTING CLASS COUNSEL AND THE DETERMINING OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES

A.

Appointing Class Counsel

In 2003, Federal Rule 23 was amended to add a new subdivision, Rule
23(g), addressing appointment of class counsel. Under Federal Rule 23(g),
the court must appoint class counsel in all cases certified under Rule 23. In
making that appointment, the court must consider counsel's (i) work in
investigating potential claims, (ii) experience in handling "class actions,
other complex litigation, and the claims of the type asserted in the action,"
(iii) knowledge of the governing law, and (iv) resources available for the
case. 67 The court may also consider "any other matter pertinent to coun68
sel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class."
When only one applicant seeks appointment as counsel, "the court may
appoint that applicant only if the applicant is adequate" under Rule 23(g)'s
criteria. 69 As I have written elsewhere, 7° although case law will determine
its ultimate impact, Rule 23(g) appears to be a positive step in ensuring
adequacy of counsel. It focuses the court's attention squarely on counsel's
fitness and qualifications to represent a class. Rule 23(g) recognizes that,
just because a particular lawyer files a putative class action lawsuit does not
mean that the lawyer has the qualifications or experience necessary to take
on that important role.
63. Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("When doubt exists
concerning certification of the class, the court should err in favor of allowing the case to proceed as a
class action.").
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee notes (2003).
65. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1).
66. Of course, even under such a rule, a court would have authority to decertify if circumstances
later revealed that the reasons for the initial certification were no longer valid. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1)(C) ("An order under Rule 23(c)(1) may be altered or amended before final judgment.").
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(i).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(ii).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2)(B).
70. Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary'sFlawed Application of Rule 23's "'Adequacy of Representation" Requirement, 2004 MICH. L. REV. 671, 689, 697, 699 (2004) (citing statistics indicating lax enforcement of adequacy of counsel requirement under Rule 23(a)(4) and discussing recent Rule 23(g)).
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One commentator worries that under Rule 23(g), "no attorney or firm
will go to the trouble of developing a class action if there is a significant
chance that the court will not appoint him or her as class counsel[,]" and
that "[w]orthy cases . . . may therefore be ignored."" t I do not view this
concern as justified. In my view, it is highly unlikely that Rule 23(g) will
deter qualified counsel from investigating and pursuing "worthy cases." If
counsel has concerns about his or her class action credentials, he or she
need only associate a prominent plaintiff class action firm as co-counsel to
allay possible objections by the court. Indeed, ten years ago Congress imposed similar rules for securities fraud class actions, and no slowdown in
prosecuting such cases has resulted. Specifically, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 [hereinafter Reform Act]72 requires that, in securities fraud cases, the court shall select the "lead plaintiff" who is "most
capable of adequately representing the interests of class members .... 171
The lead plaintiff, in turn, selects class counsel, but that selection is "subject
to the approval of the court. ' 74 Thus, under the Reform Act, as under
Rule 23(g), there is no guarantee that an attorney who investigates possible
securities fraud claims will be approved as class counsel. Yet, statistics on
case filings under the Reform Act reveal no evidence that that Act has in
75
any way deterred the prosecution of securities fraud cases.
Only one state thus far has adopted the language of Federal Rule
23(g). 76 There can be no serious question, however, that Rule 23(g) is a
worthy addition to Federal Rule 23 and that Mississippi should include this
provision in its own class action rule.
B.

Attorneys' Fees

1. Federal Rule 23(h)
Also in 2003, Federal Rule 23(h) took effect. Under Rule 23(h), a
request for attorneys' fees must be made by motion, 77 and "[a] class mem'78
ber, or a party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion.
Notice of "motions [for fees] by class counsel" must be "directed to class
members in a reasonable manner."7 9 In awarding fees, the court "must"
71. Note, The Influence of Mass Toxic Tort Litigation on Class Action Rules Reform, 22 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 249, 280 (2004).
72. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v); See also Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 219 F.R.D. 603, (W.D.
Wis. 2002) (quoting § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v)); In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 175
(D.N.J. 1999) ("The decision to approve counsel selected by the lead plaintiff is a matter within the
discretion of the district court.").
75. For the years 1992-1995, the average number of federal securities fraud class actions filed per
year was 196. For the years 1996-2004, the average annual number of such cases was 239. See Stanford
Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/index.html
(last visited April 21, 2005).
76. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(g).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(2).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1).
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make findings of fact and conclusions of law.8 0 Although some courts followed similar procedures even before the adoption of Rule 23(h), others
did not. As one commentator points out, the principal impact of Rule
23(h) is to focus the court on the need "to weigh the benefit actually
achieved for class members against the class counsel's fee request."8 1 Although notifying the class about an attorneys' fees motion will entail some
delay and expense,8 2 the benefits of Rule 23(h) would appear to outweigh
the costs. Consequently, even though only one state has thus far adopted
the language of Rule 23(h),8 3 Mississippi should adopt this provision as
part of its class action rule.
2.

Basing Attorneys' Fees on Actual Recovery Claimed By Class
Members

One controversial issue regarding attorneys' fees arises in class action
settlements in which the funds unclaimed by class members revert to the
defendant. That issue is whether attorneys' fees should be calculated based
on the potential fund (the total amount available to the class if all class
members file claims) or on only the actual portion of the fund claimed by
members of the class.
For example, assume that the class and the defendant agree to create a
$30 million fund to settle claims regarding a defective product. Assume
further that, at the end of the claims process, class members have claimed
only $2 million of that amount, and the other $28 million will revert to the
defendant. Fees based on twenty percent of the total fund would be $6
million, three times the amount actually claimed by the class; fees based on
the actual amount claimed would be only $400,000. The issue for purposes
of this article is whether Mississippi's class action rule should explicitly endorse one approach or the other. I know of no class action rule that
squarely addresses this question.84 Instead, the issue has arisen under the
case law in the context of specific fee awards.
Some courts have held that fees may be calculated based on the total
fund created, regardless of the actual claims rate. These courts find that
the class benefits from the total fund created, even if only a fraction of the
fund is claimed. For instance, in Waters v. International Precious Metals
Corp.,85 the Eleventh Circuit approved fees based on a $40 million settlement fund without regard to the actual claims made against the fund. In so
doing, it explained:
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(3).
81. Note, The Influence of Mass Toxic Tort Litigation on Class Action Rules Reform, 22

VA.

L.J. 249, 281 (2004).
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1) (notice of "motions [for fees] by class counsel" must be "directed to class members in a reasonable manner").
83. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(h).
84. Some class action rules regulate or limit attorneys' fees in other ways. See, e.g., TEX. R. Civ.
P. 42(i)(1) ("In awarding attorney fees, the court must first determine a lodestar figure by multiplying
the number of hours reasonably worked times a reasonable hourly rate. The attorney fees award must
be in the range of 25% to 400% of the lodestar figure.").
85. 190 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1223 (2000).
ENVTL.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 24:261

Each class claimant benefited from having the total amount
of the fund set at $40 million because the individual payment was based upon a percentage of the total fund. The
amount of the total fund determined the amount of each
class member's claim, regardless of the actual number of
claims filed.8 6
One appellate court has gone so far as to find that a district court abused its
discretion in calculating fees based on the actual payout ($10,000) instead
of on the amount of the settlement fund made available for claims ($4.5
million) .87
Not all judges agree with the soundness of awarding fees based on
potential rather than actual payout. In the Waters case, for example, although the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Justice O'Connor issued a
statement accompanying the denial of certiorari:
Arrangements such as that at issue here decouple class
counsel's financial incentives from those of the class, increasing the risk that the actual distribution will be misallocated between attorney's fees and the plaintiff's recovery.
They potentially undermine the underlying purposes of class
actions by providing defendants with a powerful means to
enticing class counsel to settle lawsuits in a manner detrimental to the class. And they could encourage the filing of
needless lawsuits where, because the value of each class
member's individual claim is small compared to the transaction costs in obtaining recovery, the actual distribution to
the class will inevitably be minimal.88
Surprisingly, despite the concerns raised by Justice O'Connor, this issue has not raised a groundswell of concern among commentators. One
recent article, for example, notes that, although "calculating attorney's fees
...as a percentage of the total fund carries the risk of encouraging collusion and frivolous lawsuits," that approach "creates a needed incentive for
class counsel to bring small claim consumer class actions."89
The drafters of Mississippi's class action rule may wish to study this
issue. They may conclude that the risks of collusion and baseless lawsuits
are so serious that a blanket rule prohibiting fees based on unclaimed funds

86. Id.
87. Williams v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 129 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1997).
88. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1224 (2000) (statement of Justice O'Connor). See also Strong v. Bell
South Telecommunications, Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 852 (5th Cir. 1998) (no abuse of discretion in awarding
fees based on actual payout instead of on total fund).
89. Hailyn Chen Comment, Attorneys' Fees and Reversionary Fund Settlements in Small Claims
Consumer Class Actions, 50 UCLA L. REV.879, 902 (2003).
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is warranted. Alternatively, the drafters may conclude that a rule permitting fees based on the total fund, regardless of claims made, is necessary to
encourage meritorious class action suits to be brought. 90
A more cautious approach may be to leave this issue unsettled in the
first instance and study it further in light of actual settlements and fee
awards in Mississippi following the adoption of a class action rule. In the
interim, trial judges would presumably have discretion to set fees under
either approach, depending on the circumstances of the particular case.
IV.

A.

SETTLEMENT ISSUES

CertificationStandards Governing Settlement

In drafting its class action rule, Mississippi will want to give serious
consideration as to the standards that will apply in ruling on so-called "settlement classes." A settlement class is one in which the case has settled
(subject to court approval), either upon the filing of the complaint or thereafter, but before the court has ruled on a contested motion for class certification. Because the case is settling, the question arises whether the class
has to meet all of the requirements for certification that would apply if the
case were going to trial (e.g., for a (b)(3) class, the 23(a) criteria, predominance, and superiority). Or can the court take into account the fact of settlement and apply more relaxed criteria, focusing primarily on the fairness
and reasonableness of the settlement? This issue has generated substantial
debate and controversy. To understand the issues, some brief background
is necessary.
In Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,91 the Third Circuit held that
when the parties simultaneously seek class certification and approval of a
classwide settlement, the class must satisfy all the requirements of a class
certified for trial, even though the settlement means that the case will not
be tried. The court reviewed the text of Rule 23 and concluded, "we do not
believe that the drafters of the present rule included a more liberal standard [for settlement classes] for 23(b)(3). ' g According to the court, "each
of [the] requirements [of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3)] must be satisfied without
taking into account the settlement, and as if the action were going to be
litigated."9 3 Applying that analysis, the court struck down an asbestos class
settlement that had been approved by the district court. The Third Circuit
issued its decision on May 10, 1996.
90. In considering a rule addressing this issue, the drafters would need to determine whether
such a rule would be procedural or instead would be a substantive change in law requiring legislation.
See, e.g., Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975) (noting "inherent power of [the Mississippi
Supreme] Court to promulgate proceduralrules") (emphasis added). The drafters might also wish to
consider alternative ways of addressing the problem, such as the approach of the Texas class action rule.
See supra, note 86 and accompanying text.
91. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
92. Id. at 625.
93. Id. at 626.
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On August 15, 1996, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules published, for notice and comment, a proposed amendment to Rule 23 (Rule
23(b)(4)) that would permit a court in a (b)(3) class action to certify a class
for settlement "even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might

not be met."' 94 The Advisory Committee Notes to the proposed rule specifically cited Georgine and noted that it was in conflict with other decisions
that had allowed the fact of settlement to be considered in ruling on the
certification of a settlement class.95 In explaining the proposal, the Advi-

sory Committee Notes indicated that under the proposal, all of the requirements of Rule 23(a), and the predominance and superiority requirements
of (b)(3), "must be satisfied." 96 Yet, somewhat inconsistently, the Notes

went on to state:
[Implementation of the factors that control certification of
a (b)(3) class is affected by the many differences between
settlement and litigation of class claims or defenses.

Choice-of-law difficulties, for example, may force certification of many subclasses, or even defeat any class certification, if claims are to be litigated. Settlement can be reached,

however, on terms that surmount such difficulties. Many
other elements are affected as well. A single court may be
able to manage settlement when litigation would require re-

sort to many courts. And, perhaps most important, settlement may prove far superior to litigation in devising
comprehensive solutions to large-scale problems that defy
ready disposition by traditional adversary litigation. Important benefits may be provided for those who, knowing of the

class settlement and the opportunity to opt out, prefer to
participate in the class judgment and avoid the costs of individual litigation. 97
Proposed Rule 23(b)(4) generated strong reactions, both positive and
negative. 98
94. Proposed Rule 23(b)(4), reprinted in Linda Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed
Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARiz. L. REV. 615, 640 (1997).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(4) Advisory Committee's note (1996), reprinted in Mullenix, supra
note 94, at 644-45 (citing cases contrary to Georgine as including Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61,
72-73 (2d Cir. 1982); and In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 170-71, 173-78 (5th Cir.
1979)).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(4) Advisory Committee's note (1996), reprinted in Mullenix, supra
note 94, at 645.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (noting controversy);
Mullenix, supra note 94, at 622-39 (collecting and responding to various criticisms of proposed Rule
23(b)(4)); Christopher J. Willis, Collision Course or Coexistence? Amchem Products v. Windsor and
Proposed Rule 23(b)(4), 23 CUMB. L. REV. 13, 33-35 (1997/1998) (criticizing proposed rule for watering
down Rule 23's protections of predominance, adequacy, and typicality, "each of which is a vital ingredient to protecting absent class members' rights"); Eric Green, Symposium on Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 Into the
Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1798-99 (1997) (discussing extensive scholarly criticism
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Georgine on November 1,
1996, 99 and on June 25, 1997, it issued its opinion, captioned as Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor."° Although the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the Third Circuit, its analysis was somewhat different. Specifically, the Court held that settlement was relevant to whether, under Rule
23(b)(3)(D), the case presents manageability problems. According to the
Court, "a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would
present intractable management problems .. . for the proposal is that there
be no trial."'' With respect to the other requirements of Rule 23(a) and
(b)(3), however, the Court stated that "undiluted, even heightened attention [is required] in the settlement context.'1 0 2 In other words, the requirements of adequacy, typicality, commonality, numerosity, predominance,
and superiority (excluding manageability) apply fully (and perhaps to an
even greater extent) in the settlement context.
After Amchem, the need for proposed Rule 23(b)(4) was uncertain.
Some commentators read Amchem's holding on manageability (i.e., that
manageability for trial is not relevant to a settlement class) as essentially
adopting the approach of proposed Rule 23(b)(4). 10 3 Other commentators,
however, were not so sure. Before Amchem, some courts had suggested
that a settlement class could be approved if it was fair, even if it did not
strictly comply with Rule 23(b)(3). °4 To the extent that Rule 23(b)(4) was
designed to adopt the approach of such cases, the proposed rule was "in
conflict with Amchem's holding circumscribing settlement classes."1 °5
Under the latter interpretation of proposed Rule 23(b)(4), the proposal
would not be rendered moot by Amchem. In all events, whether or not its
proposal was completely mooted by Amchem, the Advisory Committee ultimately decided not to move forward with the (b)(4) approach.
The question for Mississippi, of course, is not whether to adopt the
precise language of proposed Rule 23(b)(4), the scope of which is not entirely clear. 10 6 Instead, the question is whether Mississippi is comfortable
of proposed Rule 23(b)(4) but concluding that the proposed amendment would "increase fairness and
efficiency in class action litigation, reduce transaction costs, increase compensation to deserving plaintiffs, decrease ruinous exposures and bankruptcy to defendants, and provide a reasonable and fair tool
in appropriate cases for federal courts to reduce the enormous drain on resources caused by multiple
harms").
99. Amchem Prod, Inc. v. Windsor 519 U.S. 957 (1996).
100. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
101. Id. at 620.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and InquisitionalJustice, 87 GEO. L.J.
1983, 2001 (1999) (Amchem "rendered the proposed rule change unnecessary").
104. See cases cited in note 95, supra. See also Darren M. Franklin Note, The Mass Tort Defendants Strike Back: Are Settlement Classes a Collusive Threat or Just a Phantom Menace?, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 163, 184-85 (2000) (discussing case law).
105. Id. at 185.
106. Louisiana has adopted language essentially identical to proposed Rule 23(b)(4). See LA.
CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 591B(4) (1960) ("The parties to a settlement [may] request certification
under Subparagraph B(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of Subparagraph
B(3) might not otherwise be met.") There are, however, no published opinions interpreting the Louisiana rule.
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with the Amchem approach (which presumably would be embodied in Mississippi's adoption of Federal Rule 23 verbatim), or whether Mississippi
would instead prefer a class action rule that permits a settlement class when
it is fair and reasonable, even if it does not strictly satisfy the certification
requirements of a litigation class. The latter approach would have at least
two benefits.
First, by not requiring strict compliance with the rules for a litigation
class, such an approach would permit some settlements that would not pass
muster under Amchem. Put another way, as Professor Mullenix notes, requiring strict compliance with the criteria of 23(a) and (b) "will kill off the
possibility of resolving mass tort litigation - and many other 10substantive
7
class actions - through the auspices of classwide settlements.
Second, a rule that does not require strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) may encourage settlement by convincing
otherwise reluctant defendants to settle. The reason for such reluctance is
that Amchem poses a serious tactical dilemma for a defendant contemplating a classwide settlement: The defendant clearly wants to obtain approval
of any settlement that it deems favorable, but it does not want to concede
the viability of a class action in the event that the settlement is rejected, for
whatever reason. Yet, if a settlement must comply with the requirements
of a litigation class (excluding manageability), a defendant may have difficulty arguing in favor of the settlement but refusing to concede, for example, that common issues predominate.1 °8 Post-Amchem, many defendants
fear that if they concede predominance or other certification requirements
in seeking approval of a settlement, they will be bound by this concession
even if the settlement falls through and defendant must ultimately contest
class certification. 10 9 By contrast, if a defendant, in pursuing a settlement,
need not concede that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are satisfied, that defendant will not have to worry about its ability to contest class
certification if the settlement is not approved.
For both of these reasons, an approach that permits settlement certification even absent strict compliance with Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) would enable more putative class action cases to settle. Such an approach raises
potential concerns, however.
First, some commentators fear that, to the extent that the focus is on
fairness rather than the Rule 23 criteria, the result may be to give insufficient attention to Rule 23 and due process issues of collusion and adequacy
of representation." 0 "Fairness" is a subjective standard, and permitting
107. Linda Mullenix, The Constitutionalityof the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39
ARIz. L. REV. 615, 637 (1997).
108. A defendant in a proposed settlement could simply take no position on whether the class
would meet the requirements for certification as a litigation class. The district court, however, might
press the defense to take a position one way or the other.
109. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding
class certification in part because defendant had previously proposed to settle case as a class action).
110. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 104, at 192 ("mass tort classes that are certifiable for settlement
but not trial invite attorney collusion"); but see Mullenix, supra note 107 (summarizing and challenging
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such a standard to be the main focus (as opposed to issues of adequacy,
typicality, and predominance) may lead to collusion between class counsel
and defendants.
Second, in light of Amchem, which allows courts to take settlement
into account on the issue of manageability,1 1 ' the need for a (b)(4) type
procedure is not entirely clear. Some commentators believe that class settlements are still quite easily approved post-Amchem t12
In short, while the drafters of a Mississippi class action rule may feel
inclined to take a position on the requirements for settlement classes, the
most prudent approach may be to refrain from adopting special criteria for
settlement classes unless and until such a need reveals itself once Mississippi's class action rule is in place. The rule can always be amended to ease
the requirements for settlement classes if the criteria adopted by Mississippi lead to the rejection of meritorious settlements.
B.

Second Opt-Out for Members of a Settlement Class

Federal Rule 23(e) was amended in 2003 to provide that, in a class
previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), "the court may refuse to approve
a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to
individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so."' 1"3 This provision (new Rule 23(e)(3)) deals with
the situation in which the time to opt out of a class has already expired
before the parties reach a proposed settlement.1 14 Before the enactment of
this provision, the only options for class members in such a situation were
to accept the settlement or argue that the court should reject it. Class
members could not opt out, having already had the opportunity to do so
prior to the settlement. Now a federal court has the discretion to permit a
second opt out at the settlement stage. As the Advisory Committee Notes
state, "[a] decision to remain in the class is likely to be more carefully con11 5
sidered and is better informed when the settlement terms are known.
Defendants obviously wish to minimize opt-outs when there is any
likelihood that those opt-outs will pursue either individual or aggregate litigation. Indeed, many settlement agreements permit defendants to walk
away if opt-outs exceed a specified number. The overarching purpose of a
settlement, from a defendant's perspective, is to buy global peace. Significant opt-outs pose the risk of additional individual (or even class action)
view of opponents to (b)(4) that "the settlement class mechanism would undermine the due process
requirement for adequate class representation").
111. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Franklin, 53 STAN. L. REV. at 189 ("[D]espite Amchem, federal district courts have
continued to certify settlement classes in products liability suits") (citing examples).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3).

114. The provision would not be needed for cases filed as settlement classes under (b)(3). In that
circumstance, in which the parties request certification and approval of a settlement simultaneously,
Rule 23(b)(3) itself would permit opt-outs at the time of settlement, so there would be no need for a
second opt-out.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee notes (2003).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 24:261

lawsuits. Knowing that another opportunity to opt-out may exist, defend-

ants undoubtedly will attempt to make settlement proposals more attractive to class members, thereby discouraging additional opt-outs in the event
that the court invokes Rule 23(e)(3) and allows a second opt-out period.

This result has the salutary effect of helping class members to receive a fair
settlement. Although only one state has thus far adopted the equivalent of
new Rule 23(e)(3), 1 16 Mississippi should include a version of it in its class
action rule.
V.

REVIEW AND BINDING EFFECT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION RULINGS

A.

Interlocutory Review of Class Certification Rulings

Federal Rule 23(f), added in 1998, permits a court of appeals, "in its
discretion," to grant interlocutory review of an order "granting or denying
class certification under [Rule 23]."' 117 Interlocutory review of class certifias of right or on a discretionary basis, in a
cation orders is also available,
118

large number of states.
Since the adoption of Rule 23(f) in 1998, the federal circuit courts have

almost every fedreviewed numerous class certification rulings.1 19 Indeed,
121
23(f).
Rule
under
review
granted
eral circuit has

The rationale of Rule 23(f) is that the class certification ruling is frequently the dispositive issue in the case. Thus, "[f]or some cases the denial
of class status sounds the death knell of the litigation, because the repre' 121
sentative plaintiff's claim is too small to justify the expense of litigation.
116. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(e)(3).
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
118. See, e.g., Alabama, ALA. CODE § 6-5-642 (1993 & Supp. 2004); Arkansas, ARK. R. App. P.R.
2(a)(9); California, Darr v. Yellow Cab. Co, 433 P.2d 732, 735-37 (Ca. 1967) (denial of class certification
is an appealable final judgment); Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-20-901 (West 2004); Florida, FLA.
R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vii) and 9.130(a)(6); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-23(f); Iowa, IOWA R.
Civ. P. 1.264(3); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223(f) (as amended by H.R. 2764, Sess. Laws 21 (Kan.
2004)); Massachusetts, Dowel v. Comm'r of Transitional Assistance, 677 N.E.2d 213, 214 (Mass. 1997)
(permitting direct appellate review of class certification decisions); New Mexico, N.M. Dist. Ct. R. Civ.
P. 1-023(F); New York, Kidd v. Delta Funding Corp. 734 N.Y.S.2d 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (permitting appellate review of class action certification); North Carolina, Nobles v. First Carolina Comm., Inc.,
423 S.E.2d 312, 315 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that an order denying certification of a class action is
appealable); North Dakota, N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02(B)(5);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 993(A)(6) (West 2000); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 19.225 (2003);
Pennsylvania, PA. R. App. P. 1311; Texas, TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon 1997);
Vermont, VT. R. Civ. P. 23(f); West Virginia, Mitchem v. Melton, 277 S.E.2d 895, 901 (W. Va. 1981)
("an order denying class action standing under Rule 23 may be appealed").
119. A search of LEXIS on December 7, 2005, reveals that 88 appellate decisions have granted
Rule 23(f) review.
120. See, e.g., Garcia ex rel. G.A. Garcia & Sons Farm, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS, No. 04-8008, 26406
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 2004); Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig. v. Visa, United States, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Chiang, 385 F.3d 256
(3d Cir. 2004); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., 255 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Tex. Auto. Dealers
Ass'n, 387 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2004); Olden v. Lafarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004); Carnegie v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004); Reinholdson v. State, 346 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2003);
Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2004); Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363
F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2004).
121. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999).
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By the same token, "a grant of class status can put considerable pressure on

the defendant to settle, even when the plaintiff's probability of success on
the merits is slight.' 1 22 Interlocutory review gives the appellate court a
chance to review the certification decision before these severe consequences come into play. There would seem to be little downside and much

benefit in Mississippi's including a provision for interlocutory review (either mandatory or discretionary) as part of its class action rule.
B.

Preventing Relitigation of Class Certification

What happens when, after unsuccessfully seeking class certification in

one court, the same or different attorneys attempt to seek certification of
essentially the same class in another court? Lawyers may attempt to seek
class certification under a new Mississippi class action rule after being
rebuffed by other courts. Mississippi could, under that scenario, become
inundated with class actions that have already been held inappropriate for
certification. Mississippi needs to decide whether it will entertain suits in
which certification has been previously rejected.
As a result of the recent enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of

2005 [hereinafter CAFA], 12 3 this problem is somewhat less acute than it
might otherwise have been. Prior to the CAFA, many nationwide class
actions involving state law claims were filed in and remained in state
court. 124 Under the CAFA, however, most multi-state class actions will be

removable to federal court.125 Nonetheless, classes that do not qualify for

federal jurisdiction post-CAFA will still be brought in state court. In those

cases, when class certification is denied by a court in another state, the
defeated lawyers (or other lawyers) may attempt to bring essentially the
same class action in Mississippi. In addition, the CAFA does not impact a
separate potential problem: one Mississippi judge denies class certification
and the same (or different) lawyers then seek certification of essentially the
122. Id.
123. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) [hereinafter CAFA].
124. In general, prior to the enactment of the CAFA, diversity jurisdiction in class actions existed
only if (1) no class representative was a citizen of the same state as any defendant and (2) each class
member satisfied the $75,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy (or, in the view of some courts, at
least one class representative satisfied the $75,000 amount, allowing the court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the remaining class members). See generally Klonoff supra
note [?], at 188-94 (discussing diversity jurisdiction principles for class actions, including impact of supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367); Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125
S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed. 2d. 502 (2005) (holding that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, only a class representative
(as opposed to all class members) needs to satisfy the jurisdictional amount).
125. Under the CAFA, district courts have original jurisdiction in a class action when the total
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, even if individual class members are seeking less than
$75,000 each. Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), Sec. 4(a)(2). Moreover, only minimal diversity is required (i.e., the existence of at least one member of the proposed class who is a citizen of a different
state than any defendant). Id., Sec. 4(a)(2)(A). Under the Act, if fewer than one third of the class are
from the same state, the federal court is required to accept jurisdiction (assuming minimal diversity and
$5 million at issue). If more than two-thirds of the class are from the state where the suit was filed, and
if at least one of the significant defendants is from that state, then the federal court must decline jurisdiction. Id., Sec. 4(a)(2). When between one-third and two-thirds of the class are from the forum state
and the primary defendants are from that state, the federal court has discretion to decline or accept
jurisdiction, based on a variety of criteria set forth in the statute. Id., Sec. 4(a)(3).
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same class before another Mississippi judge. The issue in both of these
circumstances (first suit filed outside Mississippi and first suit filed in Mississippi) is whether the prior ruling denying class certification is somehow
binding on the later court faced with a request to certify essentially the
same class.
Courts have taken a variety of approaches in deciding this issue. For
instance, in J.R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chemical Co., 1 2 6 a putative
class unsuccessfully sought class certification in federal court. Subsequently, the attorney for the class brought another suit in Texas state court
asserting largely the same claims and again seeking class certification. Defendants asked the federal court that had previously denied certification to
enjoin the state court from considering the certification issue. The district
court refused to do so, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that "[t]he denial of class certification is 'a procedural ruling,' and
the decision as to whether to certify a class lies within the 'wide discretion'
of the trial court.' 1 27 The court added that the refusal of the district court
to intervene was particularly justified because the second action involved
the Texas class action rule-albeit, one modeled after Federal Rule 23not Federal Rule 23 itself, and "a Texas court might well exercise [its] dis128
cretion in a different manner.'
Subsequently, in In re Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation,t 29 the Seventh Circuit took a different approach. In an
earlier decision, the Seventh Circuit had held that a nationwide class of
Firestone tire owners and Ford Explorer owners could not be certified because, inter alia, of the need to apply the laws of all of the U.S. states and
territories. 130 After that ruling, plaintiffs' counsel filed putative class action
suits in various state courts, seeking certification of nationwide classes similar to the one rejected by the Seventh Circuit. Defendants asked the district court to enjoin the state actions, but the court refused. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, reversed. The court
held that under collateral estoppel, the issue of class certification was fully
litigated in the Seventh Circuit and thus could be given preclusive effect. It
found that, for purposes of collateral estoppel, the unnamed class members
should be deemed parties in the earlier action because they were adequately represented by the class representatives. The Seventh Circuit
found no impediment under the Anti-Injunction Act, 3 ' which normally
prevents federal courts from enjoining state court litigation, because an injunction was necessary to protect the federal court certification ruling. The
court explained that, without preclusive effect, class counsel could keep litigating until they found a court willing to certify:
126. J. R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chemical Co., 93 F.3d 176 (5th Cir. 1996).
127. Id. at 180 (citations omitted).
128. Ashland, 93 F.3d at 180.
129. In re Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003).
130. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
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Relitigation can turn even an unlikely outcome into reality.
Suppose that every state in the nation would as a matter of
first principles deem inappropriate a nationwide class covering these claims and products. What this might mean in
practice is something like "9 of 10 judges in every state
would rule against certifying a nationwide class" (in the federal courts, it has meant that 3 of 4 judges have ruled against
the proposed nationwide classes). Although the 10% that
see things otherwise are a distinct minority, one is bound to
turn up if plaintiffs file enough suits - and, if one nationwide
class is certified, then all the no-certification decisions fade
into insignificance. A single positive trumps all the negatives. Even if just one judge in ten believes that a nationwide class is lawful, then if the plaintiffs file in ten different
states the probability that at least one will certify a nationwide class is 65% (0.9 10 = 0.349). Filing in 20 states produces an 88% probability of national class certification (0.9
20 = 0.122). This happens whenever plaintiffs can roll the
dice as many times as they please - when nationwide class
certification sticks (because it subsumes all other suits)
while a no-certification decision has no enduring effect.
[The Anti Injunction Act] permits a federal court to issue an
injunction that will stop such a process in its tracks and hold
both sides to a fully litigated outcome, rather than perpetuating an asymmetric
system in which class counsel can win
132
but never lose.
A Louisiana state appellate court, in Duffy v. Si-Sifh, 1 33 also has
blocked attempts to relitigate the issue of class certification. After a putative class action involving insurance claims was rejected by a trial court in
Jefferson Parish on the grounds that a class action was not appropriate
under Louisiana's class action rule, the same lawyers filed essentially the
same suit in Orleans Parish, seeking certification of the identically defined
class but utilizing different named plaintiffs as the proposed class representatives. The trial court rejected defendants' argument that class certification was barred by the earlier ruling, but the court of appeal reversed on
a supervisory writ. Applying res judicata, on the theory that a request for a
class action is a claim, the court reasoned that "allowing the plaintiffs to
relitigate the class action question in the instant case would encourage forum shopping, allowing the plaintiffs numerous 'bites' at the class action
'
'apple,' and frustrate the purposes of the res judicata doctrine." 134
132. In re Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc., 333 F.3d at 766-67 (emphasis in original).
133. Duffy v. Si-Sifh, 726 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999).
134. Id. at 443. The procedural context of Duffy, of course, is very different from that in Bridgestone/Firestone. In the latter case, the first court applied its ruling by enjoining later courts from certifying classes. In Duffy, by contrast, the second court relied on the first court's ruling rejecting class
certification.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 24:261

Mississippi could, if it chose, avoid this sort of forum shopping and
relitigation by barring motions for class certification in cases in which the
same (or virtually the same) class certification theories were rejected either
in another Mississippi court or in a court in another state. A rule to this
effect would prevent class action plaintiff lawyers from having "numerous
'bites' at the class action 'apple."'
The problem with such an approach is that drafting a suitable, but not
overly sweeping, rule (or statute) may be exceedingly difficult. For instance, if an earlier putative class action was rejected because of an inadequate representative, and if a new representative has been substituted, it
would seem unwarranted to preclude the second suit from going forward.
Similarly, if the first suit was a nationwide class and was not certified because of the difficulty in applying the laws of fifty states, that denial of
certification should not automatically bar a statewide class action, brought
under the law of a single state, from going forward. On the other hand, in
cases such as Duffy and Firestone,it is arguably unfair to permit class counsel to refile the same class action lawsuit that was previously found illsuited for certification.
The commentators addressing this issue have been skeptical of the
Firestone approach and are inclined to permit class counsel to make multiple attempts at class certification. 135 One option for Mississippi, short of
not addressing the issue at all in its class action rule, would be to enact a
provision requiring a court to consider, as a factor in ruling on certification,
any prior ruling refusing to certify the same or a similar class. 136 Such a
provision would highlight to judges that they cannot simply ignore prior
unsuccessful efforts to obtain class certification. Instead, those earlier rulings would be part of the mix of factors that a court would consider in
ruling on class certification.
CONCLUSION

This article has identified a number of issues that Mississippi should
consider as it contemplates the contours of a class action rule. The article is
by no means exhaustive, but it does serve to highlight some important and
contentious decisions that the drafters will have to face as they put pen to
paper.

135. See, e.g., Case Note on Firestone, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2038 (2004) ("[Slome risk of
duplication of litigation is an inevitable cost of a system in which federal district court judges have
broad discretion to deny class certification and states are free to manage their own judicial systems with
their own class action rules."); Alexander Moeser Note, Precluding the Absent Claimantfrom Re-Arguing Class Certification:Pragmatism and the "Day in Court" Ideal, 92 Ky. L.J. 817, 839 (2004) ("courts
must resist the blanket approach" of Firestone).
136. Cf. Case Note, supra note 135, at 2038 ("States could ... adopt[ ] incremental reforms, such
as class action rules that direct judges to take note of prior denials of certification by other courts.").

